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Abstract
This article presents a historical case study of three armed organisations that operated in Portugal before and after 
the April Revolution of 1974. This event put an end to Estado Novo’s authoritarian regime, starting a period of 
transition to democracy. The armed organisations operating during Estado Novo sought, essentially, to combat 
the dictatorship and the Colonial War. These organisations channelled their actions towards the destruction of the 
regime’s repressive and colonial apparatus, but refused to use lethal violence. During the transition to democracy, 
disillusionment caused by the negative outcome of the revolutionary process and the end of the utopia of the 
socialist revolution led some sectors of the radical left to return to armed struggle. This time, such actors targeted 
both property and human beings but were highly selective in their targeting. We analyse the narratives of restraint 
of former militants from across these groups, and consider how they were shaped by the evolving socio-political 
context. In the case of the pre-revolution organisations, we found two collectively accepted narratives inscribed 
in their genesis: lethal violence as counterproductive and lethal violence as philosophically and ideologically 
problematic. In the case of the post-revolution organisation we found one restraint narrative shared by the 
collective: indiscriminate lethal violence is counterproductive. Some militants also developed a restraint narrative 
that centred on disappointment with the organisation for its perceived operational failures. This study is based on 
a narrative analysis of data dispersed across personal and public archives, writings, and memoirs of individuals 
directly and indirectly involved in the armed struggle, with data collected through interviews with former politically 
violent militants.
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Introduction
In this article, we examine the narratives of restraint on lethal violence in the context of three armed 
organisations that operated in Portugal form the 1960s through to the 1980s. Firstly, we explain why political 
violence by non-state actors was scant and erratic in Portugal during most of the twentieth century, which 
was dominated by Estado Novo, a repressive authoritarian regime. Secondly, we explore how dominant socio-
political narratives influenced internal mechanisms and processes regarding the type of, and limits to, the 
violence committed by three different armed organisations: the ARA (Ação Revolucionária Armada [Armed 
Revolutionary Action]) and the BR (Brigadas Revolucionárias [Revolutionary Brigades]), which acted during 
the dictatorship; and the FP-25 (Forças Populares do 25 de Abril [Popular Forces of the 25th of April]), which 
acted in a period of consolidated democracy. In doing so, we aim to understand why, and to what extent, 
radical left armed organisations in contemporary Portugal restrained their use of lethal violence.
The breadth and variety of our data allows us to offer a valuable snapshot of the main narratives of restraint 
to lethal violence shared by former militants who were part of the three armed organisations under analysis. 
We identify factors which pushed specific organisations not to be lethal (ARA and BR), to be selectively lethal 
(FP-25), and not to engage in indiscriminatory acts of violence (all three organisations). We also investigate 
the dominant historical narrative guiding the ideology behind the creation of the armed organisations, to 
determine what distinguishes lethal and non-lethal organisations that are ideologically similar, as we concur 
with Smith and Monforte that “the stories people tell are constructed from resources that emerge from outside 
them and these stories need to be considered as culturally and relationally constructed”.[1] Thus, this case 
study broadens the literature beyond the focus on religious organisations, particularly those connected to al-
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Qaeda- and/or Islamic State-inspired terrorism, presenting the case of three armed radical left organisations 
that have received little scholarly attention. It also examines the interplay between a range of strategic and 
moral considerations in the context of restraint that have been put forward and explored by other scholars.[2]
This research article is based on a qualitative methodology, which triangulates data dispersed across personal 
and public archives, writings, and memoirs of individuals directly and indirectly involved in the Portuguese 
armed struggle in the twentieth century, with data collected through interviews with former ARA, BR, and 
FP-25 militants. A total of 24 interviews were collected independently by both authors in the context of larger 
research projects.[3] They both followed a similar semi-structured schedule. This included questions about the 
use of violence and was used in a flexible way to help stimulate reflection on important topics related to past 
engagement in the armed struggle, while allowing each interviewee to guide the course of the conversation 
and to choose what to recount and how. In this study, we employed thematic narrative analysis to identify the 
accounts related to the commission of violence, and analyse how stories on restraint and escalation of violence 
draw on, or attempt to, resist socio-political narrative resources, as stories not only work “for people,” but also 
work “on people,” leading their construction and understanding of reality, and their course of action.[4]
The Socio-Political Context of the Contemporary Radical Left Armed Struggle in 
Portugal (1962-1986) 
Estado Novo was the longest standing dictatorship in Western Europe (1926-1974). Despite being a typical 
dictatorship of the fascist era, during its long duration, as the world around it changed it had to adapt to survive.
[5] From the early 1950s, social changes caused by economic and industrial development, rural exodus, and 
emigration to other European countries allowed the growth of the middle class and accelerated the schooling 
of the masses. This, in combination with increasing access to information about what was happening in the 
world, altered public attitudes and opinion, and ultimately fostered opposition to the regime.[6]
In 1968, António de Oliveira Salazar, the regime’s mastermind, was incapacitated after falling from a chair. He 
was replaced by Marcelo Caetano as President of the Council, giving rise to the so-called Primavera Marcelista 
(Marcelist Spring). This was a short period in which a number of reforms made it look like the dictatorial 
situation in Portugal was changing and that the Colonial War could end. However, the beginning of 1970 
brought renewed political repression and the determination to carry on waging war in the colonies. This 
raised societal tensions and contributed to the opposition’s radicalisation.[7] The Colonial War was key in the 
radicalisation of the political struggle in Portugal and the move towards armed violence. It began in February 
1961, in Angola, spreading rapidly to Guinea, in January 1963, and to Mozambique, in August 1964, dragging 
on seemingly with no end in sight. Military recruitment, of more than 900.000 young people, was a decisive 
factor in the massive emigration of these years. In total 16% of the population (1.4 million) emigrated between 
1961 and 1974, two thirds of whom emigrated illegally, including 250.000 fleeing military service. For large 
sectors of society, the demand for an end to the war began to mark their political activities and encouraged 
them to challenge the regime.[8] In this context, revolutionary radical left organisations multiplied, attempting 
to train young guerrillas and collect weapons.[9]
Three organisations decided to engage in armed struggle: the LUAR (Liga Unitária de Ação Revolucionária 
[League of Unity and Armed Revolution]), the ARA and the BR. In this article, we do not analyse the LUAR 
because this organisation lacks the connections that existed among the three other organisations under 
analysis, both in ideological and operational terms. LUAR’s full structure was based abroad, especially in Paris 
and Belgium, and all its attempts at armed actions in Portugal were halted by the political police. The LUAR 
renounced the armed struggle shortly after the April Revolution.[10] The ARA and the BR, as explored in the 
following sections, carried out armed actions motivated by anti-fascist, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist 
positions, but did not resort to lethal violence before the April Revolution.
The revolutionary process triggered by the April Revolution was led by radical left groups, both those who 
carried out armed actions and those who only theorised about their need during the dictatorship. Their aim was 
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for the workers to seize power and construct a socialist society.[11] This revolutionary movement sought new 
forms of democratic organisation and expressions of popular power, which manifested itself in the occupation 
of hundreds of factories, vacant houses, and large landowners’ properties in the south of Portugal. It also 
manifested itself in the Agrarian Reform, and the nationalisation of the main strategic sectors of the economy.
[12]
However, on the 25th November 1975, a military coup led by a coalition of moderate and conservative sectors 
put an end to the revolutionary process started on the 25th April 1974, which comprised a profound defeat for 
the radical left. From then on, a new phase began with the consolidation of a representative democracy, with 
its own institutions, whose legitimacy derived from the popular vote and whose political agents tried to stop 
and deflate revolutionary transformations, even if these had been constitutionally enshrined (e.g., the Agrarian 
Reform, the nationalisation of banking).[13] The radical left were frustrated by the end of the revolutionary 
experience, the beginning of the institutionalisation of democracy, the preparation of Portugal’s entry into 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and, in due course, by the enormous economic crisis that led to 
interventions of the IMF in 1977 and in 1983. Furthermore, these developments fuelled a belief within the 
radical left that Portugal was facing a new fascist offensive, prompting some within this left faction to consider 
a return to armed struggle.[14] This gave rise to the formation of the FP-25 in 1980, which carried out both 
lethal and non-lethal acts of political violence. In the subsequent sections we analyse in detail the direction 
taken by these organisations, as well as the limits that they imposed on the violence committed, and how this 
was influenced by the dominant socio-political narrative resources surrounding them.
The ARA (Ação Revolucionária Armada [Armed Revolutionary Action])
As the armed wing of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), the ARA constituted a semi-autonomous 
organisation. It followed the party’s political instructions, but also had its own board, which took independent 
decisions regarding specific armed actions.[15] Although the decision to establish the ARA was made in 1964, 
its armed activity only began in 1970.[16] The delay was related to factors such as the need for rigorous and 
time-consuming preparations, the existence of strong political repression, and uncertainty within the PCP 
about the use of armed struggle: some supported armed actions as the only way to overthrow a violent regime, 
while others preferred traditional mass struggle, in line with Soviet Union directives.[17]
Since its First Illegal Congress in 1943, the PCP had propagated the need for a national uprising as a means 
of overthrowing the dictatorship. It condoned the possible use of armed actions, as long as it was directed by 
the party, in a context of radicalisation and intensification of the mass struggle.[18] However, in the troubled 
period that followed the Second World War, the use of violence to overthrow the regime was not a priority, 
with the PCP defending a peaceful and agreed transition under the leadership of Júlio Fogaça, which started 
in 1949 due to the imprisonment of the secretary-general of the PCP, Álvaro Cunhal.[19] The latter, after his 
jailbreak on the 3rd of September 1960, fiercely criticised this political orientation and brought renewed focus 
on armed insurrection.[20] However, the party found itself in a difficult situation having to balance: 1) internal 
criticism from Cunhal regarding the ‘right-wing deviation’ that occurred during his time in prison; 2) the 
international communist movement’s line of peaceful coexistence adopted by the Soviet Union; 3) a group of 
militants demanding radical action; and 4) attempts to forge alliances with the more moderate sectors of the 
opposition outside the PCP.[21] 
This impasse was resolved when a crisis within the regime, which lasted from 1958 to 1962, and was caused 
by the fraudulent electoral campaign of General Humberto Delgado, resulted in a growing number of voices 
demanding radicalisation of the political struggle and a move towards armed violence.[22] In late 1964, the 
PCP began creating a structure dedicated to preparing and executing non-lethal armed actions directed against 
the regime’s colonial and repressive apparatus. This clandestine structure became the ARA, whose emergence 
in 1970 as an armed organisation was exceptional in the European context. No other communist party decided 
to engage in armed struggle, not even the Spanish Communist Party, which experienced similar historical 
conditions.
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In terms of the ARA’s armed actions, they were primarily aimed at disrupting the Colonial War, which 
symbolised imperialism, colonialism, repression, and loss of lives.[23] As a former ARA militant put it:
ARA’s goals were, basically, to create problems for the regime, especially for the Colonial War. Because 
we used to say that we had been in the war, the war was a terrible thing. […] The aim [of the war] was 
to kill as much as possible. And I came to hate the war, so we used to say: ‘We went to war in the service 
of the state and now we dedicate our lives to making war on war’. And so we did.[24]
This was done, for instance, through the sabotage of the ocean liners Cunene and Muxima, which transported 
troops and war material, respectively, to support the Colonial War. The Tancos air base was also sabotaged, 
destroying 16 helicopters and 11 aircrafts. None of these armed actions provoked deaths, however. The ARA also 
carried out armed actions against the state apparatus and against imperialism, such as detonating an explosive 
device outside the political police’s training college and outside the American Cultural Centre, respectively. 
However, the ARA refused to engage in lethal actions, always attempting to create circumstances in which the 
risk of loss of lives would be reduced:
We were careful to detonate explosives only at times when we knew that no one would be on the 
premises or that it was unlikely that anyone would pass by. Of course, there could be an accident, but 
we were always very careful to avoid such accidents [deaths].[25]
The ARA decided to suspend its actions in May 1973. At this point, quite a few of its militants were in 
custody and the political police had identified the members of the central command. The ARA justified this 
decision, arguing that it sought to decrease the strong repression directed against the general anti-dictatorship 
movement (e.g. progressive Catholics organising peaceful actions against the Colonial War), and in the context 
of supporting the recently created Socialist Party in the upcoming 1973 elections. The April Revolution and the 
establishment of democracy allowed the ARA to lay down its arms, and allowed its militants to integrate into 
the new political life of the country, as they believed that:
After the 25th of April, the ARA was no longer necessary, it no longer had legitimacy. Even if the ARA’s 
operations were just, they did not have legitimacy in the democracy that was developing.[26]
The main restraint narratives to the commission of lethal violence by the ARA was the view that it was 
counterproductive: a view shaped by their need to balance between their choice for armed insurrection and the 
dominant narrative defended by the Soviet Union, the international communist movement, and the Portuguese 
opposition opposing the armed struggle. Former ARA militants also reflected on the possible effects of the use 
of lethal force on their efforts to gather popular support under repressive conditions:
Our actions would not create victims and would not enable the regime to call us terrorists. They 
never managed to be able to say that. And the population could also make the distinction, and as they 
themselves were not bombed, they themselves were not confused.[27]
ARAs efforts were focused on showing people that they were fighting the regime, not the general population. 
Thus, the ARA’s restraint in engaging in lethal violence was firmly rooted in their negative assessment of what 
this kind of strategy would do for them. One former ARA militant’s reflections on the killings carried out by 
the FP-25 in the 1980s (see below for detail) help to illustrate this point:
The FP-25 killed a man in Sacavém. That man was a scoundrel, deserved to die five hundred times, but 
that operation should have never happened because it challenged... for the collective consciousness it 
called into question the nature of a left which wanted to be necessary, which wanted to be fair and to 
be ethical.[28]
According to this former militant, lethal violence as a political strategy was counterproductive to the cause of 
the general struggle, even if the targets were seen as legitimate.
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The BR (Brigadas Revolucionárias [Revolutionary Brigades]).
The launch of the BR in 1970 marked the second major political rupture within the PCP regarding to the 
armed insurrection issue.[29] This rupture represented the resistance of PCP members like Isabel do Carmo 
and Carlos Antunes (BR’s co-founders) to the dominant pacifist narrative of the PCP.[30] This position was 
strengthened by the continuation of the Colonial War and by the disillusionment following the Primavera 
Marcelista. The use of revolutionary violence was seen as a political weapon and as a form of solidarity towards 
the struggle of the liberation movements in the colonies.
The BR represented a new way of confronting the regime, turning away from PCP’s Stalinism and proposing 
armed action to achieve a socialist revolution, where power would be taken by the proletariat.[31] The BR 
always pointed to the need for a revolutionary structuring of the proletariat, in which the armed struggle and 
the mass struggle could converge.[32] The former was not considered more important than the latter, but it was 
seen as the trigger to a revolutionary organisation based on class.[33] Thus, the BR inverted the usual logic of 
the creation of armed organisations since the armed organisation surfaced first and only later, in 1973, the PRP 
(Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado [Proletariat Revolutionary Party]) was founded.[34]
In terms of armed actions, similar to the ARA, the BR mostly attacked the structures that served the Colonial 
War and the authoritarian regime.[35] According to a former BR militant this was defensible because:
The state was extremely violent, so the violence was justified. Violence paid with violence. Arms, bombs, 
whatever. The more noise we made, the better, because we were saying ‘It’s not just you, be careful 
because we can also reach you!’ So it was already justified.[36]
However, within the organisation, the debate regarding what type of actions to engage in was very intense. 
The militants coming from the PCP, including its founders, were still influenced by PCP’s dominant no-kill 
narrative and preferred spectacular and mediatic actions to draw national and international attention to the 
Portuguese political and colonial issues.[37] They opposed the use of lethal violence, defended “an ideological 
and philosophical conception of not killing anyone”,[38] and saw violence as more than just killing people:
You ask: ‘but then what is violence?’ Violence is not just killing people; violence can be destroying 
structures. We had reasons for killing, especially before the 25th of April, and we did not kill. We did not 
kill for philosophical reasons because nobody has the right to take anyone’s life.[39]
Other militants were more open to the possibility of actions such as abductions and murders of people linked 
to the regime, at least in theory. They did not proceed with such actions, however, as they saw these as being 
too difficult and dangerous. As a former BR militant explained:
To kill someone, we would have killed Salazar or Marcelo Caetano or others, right? As this was very 
complicated, we did not kill anyone. […] I had no big problems, for example, if someone proposed 
an action to kill, imagine, the PIDE [political police] director or Spínola, at the time the commander 
of Guinea, who was inventing new processes of colonialism. I thought he was a very dangerous man, 
because of that. He was not as dumb as the others.[40]
The overthrow of the regime by the April Revolution brought new debates to the now official political party 
PRP/BR, namely the choice of dissolving the armed structure or not. Some militants argued that the fall of 
the regime meant that the armed struggle was no longer legitimate. Others believed that the armed structure 
should be kept underground, ready to respond to a negative outcome of the revolutionary process.[41] PRP’s 
first political publication after the April Revolution emphasised the revolutionary violence issue: it stated that 
it remained a necessity to defend workers from the interests of the bourgeoisie, but underlined that the April 
Revolution had changed the nature of the violence, which was now in the hands of everyone. Therefore, actions 
such as strikes and workplace occupations, led by the workers themselves, should be given priority.[42] The 
PRP defended the distribution of weapons to workers’ commissions, so that they could resist in the event of a 
counter-revolutionary coup and defend the conquests of the Revolution.[43]
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In October 1975, the growing prospects of a coup led by moderate and conservative right-wing groups forced 
the PRP to move the BR back into the underground, while preserving its military structure and weapons. At 
this point, the more moderate faction of the BR had disengaged right after the April Revolution while the 
remaining militants had been further radicalised by the revolutionary process and then, by the military coup 
on the 25th November 1975. 
In hiding, the BR focused mainly on bank robberies to fund the organisation.[44] However, the PRP remained 
a legal political party and was directly involved in the 1976 electoral campaign of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho for 
president, which united a large part of the radical left. Otelo was one of the April captains who had a prominent 
role in triggering the revolution and the revolutionary process. He obtained almost 800.000 votes (17% of the 
total), which led to the rise of the MUP (Movimento de Unidade Popular [Popular Unity Movement]), a new 
political party bringing together the various radical left parties that had united around his candidacy. 
Internal disputes meant that the MUP was short-lived, however. Nonetheless the PRP kept trying to find a way 
to unite the independent sectors that supported Otelo. This gave rise to the formation of the OUT (Organização 
Unitária dos Trabalhadores [Unitary Workers Organisation]) at a congress on the 8th and 9th of April 1978. It 
brought together delegations from: Sinn Fein (Ireland); ETA (Basque Country); Workers’ Autonomy (Italy); 
the Arab Socialist Party (Iraq); the CNR Socialist Party (Chile); Venezuelan Revolutionary Party Rupture 
(Venezuela); Dominican Resistance Group (Dominican Republic); Socialist International (USA); Polisario 
Front (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic); and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (Oman). In this 
congress the return to armed struggle was strongly defended by several OUT leaders, most of them from the 
PRP.[45] 
During 1978, heightened internal differences within the PRP/BR were further intensified by the bombing of a 
freight train in Mauritania, which caused the death of eight soldiers. The attack was claimed by the Polisario 
Front, which had been carrying out a series of attacks in Mauritania as a way of fighting for the independence of 
the Sahrawi people. It was, however, organised by the Algerian Secret Services and carried out by BR militants. 
The Algerian Secret Services had pledged to finance the PRP and later continued to finance the FUP (Frente de 
Unidade Popular [Popular Unity Force]), to which we will return in the next section.[46] This was the first BR 
action intentionally meant to cause deaths. Most of the PRP leadership, who were in prison for bank robberies, 
deny knowledge of this action, sustaining that it was carried out by a splinter group that went on to start the FP-
25, and that they would have never approved it as it contravened BR’s position against lethal and indiscriminate 
violence.[47] Nonetheless, one of the former militants involved in the action affirmed that the PRP leadership 
knew about it and did not oppose it.[48] We are unable to say with certainty which version of events is closest 
to the truth. What this does indicate, however, is that within the PRP/BR the question of the type of actions to 
engage in was always on the table and over time some militants rebelled against the narratives of restraint on 
lethal violence.
In sum, as in the case of the ARA, before the April Revolution, BR militants found lethal and indiscriminate 
violence to be both counterproductive and philosophically and ideologically problematic. The former is not 
surprising as BR founders derived from the PCP. However, they did not owe allegiance to the Soviet Union or to 
the international communist movement and they were clearly in disagreement with the pacifist opposition to 
the regime. What they added to their narrative was a moral stance presented as a philosophical and ideological 
commitment not to take lives which, in their view, differentiated them from the authoritarian regime that 
exerted arbitrary power over people’s lives. After the April Revolution, some BR militants felt that their duty 
had been accomplished and that there was no justification to carry on with the armed struggle. However, this 
was not the case for all BR militants, some of whom not only remained underground, but also engaged in lethal 
violence and joined a new organisation which pursued lethal violence as part of its strategies. It is to this new 
organisation that we now turn.
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The FP-25 (Forças Populares do 25 de Abril [Popular Forces of the 25th of April])
The FP-25 publicly announced its existence on the 20th of April 1980 through the explosion of a hundred 
petards – small bombs – in different parts of the country. They also shared their Manifesto ao Povo Trabalhador 
[Manifesto to the Working People], which presented them as the embryo of a revolutionary army.[49] This 
organisation was the armed component of a broader political project, designed by the PRP in 1975, the Projecto 
Global [Global Project].[50] This project also had a political and ideological component, initially headed by 
the OUT and then by the FUP (constituted as a political party in July 1980); a military component; and a 
component called ÓSCAR, organised around Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, figurehead of the Projecto Global.[51] 
The aim of this project was to create the conditions to establish popular power through armed insurrection 
against the right-wing, which was perceived as once again seeking to take state power and violently dividing 
the left in the country.[52]
The FP-25 was composed of radical left individuals who had been very active during the revolutionary 
process that followed the April Revolution, and who felt extremely disappointed with the social and political 
developments that followed the coup of 25th November 1975.[53] Most FP-25 militants had been part of the 
PRP/BR, both before and after the April Revolution, and their choice to join the FP-25 was based on two 
considerations. Some, from a political perspective, had not supported the laying down of arms after the 25th 
April 1974 and their view that armed struggle was still needed to attain a socialist revolution intensified after 
the 25th November 1975 coup. Others felt that they had to keep fighting because they had never stopped, having 
opted to remain underground carrying out actions such as bank robberies to support their organisation, even 
as PRP/BR leaders in jail were distancing themselves from such activities in order to negotiate an amnesty.
[54] The non-PRP/BR militants within FP-25 originated from the LUAR, the FUP, as well as Trotskyist and 
anarchist circles. FP-25 also attracted a few individuals who had no record of previous political activity. Most 
militants were 15 to 20 years old when the April Revolution occurred, and some performed military service 
during the revolutionary process.
FP-25 militants were divided into small cells based in various parts of Portugal. They carried out several armed 
actions in the early 1980s, including bank robberies, detonation of explosive devices targeting both people and 
property; they also used firearms to injure or kill specific individuals.[55] A series of international solidarity 
actions were carried out, which included destruction of property, and there were plans to kidnap prominent 
public figures in order to generate funds for the organisation.[56] FP-25 actions resulted in 12 deaths.[57] Most 
of these were factory managers, who were considered to have abused their employees. This enabled the FP-25 
to claim they supported the working class by setting an example for both the workers – encouraging them to 
fight against injustices – and for the managers – discouraging them from ignoring their employees’ rights.[58] 
According to a former FP-25 militant, the organisation:
[…] appeared in the context of a major assault from the right, in order to articulate more radical ways 
of struggle and to show the workers that when certain forms of struggle are exhausted, there are other 
ways to respond to the arrogance of the capital, there are other ways of acting.[59]
For another former militant, the FP-25 was the armed wing of the workers against the abuses of the employers, 
which meant that shooting an abusive employer in the knee would be seen as:
An attempt to convey a practical message for both sides, for the employers and for the victims who 
had been laid off. If there was a guy who was not paying the salaries, or who had fled to Brazil, that guy 
needed to realise that he could not do that. And since the state did not act, at least there were some guys 
that would keep him frightened.[60]
Other targets for lethal attacks by FP-25 militants were police officers, the director of the Prison Services, 
and former members of the organisation who collaborated with the police.[61] The use of lethal violence was 
fiercely debated within the FP-25 and not all militants agreed with it. Several former militants mentioned 
endless discussions and conflicts around what type of violence was acceptable. Some considered that people 
should not be killed, because such an action could harm the struggle and turn out to be ineffective:
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I was against the killings, not for moral reasons, but for tactical reasons. […] I considered that if 
we wanted to lead by example, in pedagogical terms it was preferable to put them in a wheelchair, 
transforming them in living examples. Pedagogically that would work better than killing the guy, who 
would make the news, but after a while nobody would talk about it anymore, it would be forgotten. 
While in a wheelchair: the guy did this, but that happened.[62]
Others perceived killing a representative of the class they were fighting against to have the potential to set an 
examplefor the workers and encourage them in their struggle:
From a certain point the organisation chose to act against employers who fired people. For example, 
there was an action against the administrator of Sacavém Tableware Factory, and I thought that this was 
the type of action that could trigger the workers’ reaction. I mean, the fact that that person was reached 
could trigger a sense of strength and lead the workers to react.[63]
The latter standpoint prevailed, as it was decided that discriminate lethal violence was possible if in line with 
the organisation’s strategic plan of inciting the workers to revolt. Indiscriminate lethal violence was seen as 
counterproductive, however. According to the accounts of former FP-25 militants, the decision to kill someone 
had to be justified by the actions of specific victims:
For example, the Gelmar guy was used by the government to close companies. He would arrive and 
destroy the company; this was his speciality! […] At Sacavém Tableware Factory there were several 
suicides caused by the life the employer imposed on the workers [unpaid wages] […] In the case of 
Castelo Branco [Director of the Prison Services] there were people who fell ill: he was a tyrant […] 
Doctors would say that people needed to go to hospital and he would say: ‘No, I am the boss here’, which 
led doctors to resign […] In addition to his behaviour regarding the prisoners in general, what he was 
doing with FP-25 prisoners was totally inhuman. […] Another case that I almost forgot is the case of 
the penitent, these are actions that I personally understand, and I understand them as messages that 
need to be pushed through.[64]
According to this former militant, FP-25’s victims were in fact perpetrators, responsible for the suffering of 
others, and ending their life not only amounted to a form of justice, but would also act as a deterrent to 
those who would perpetrate similar injustices. This view also extended to the militants who were arrested and 
decided to collaborate with the police to bring down the organisation:
It was assumed that guys who clearly betrayed, who chose to go to the other side and cooperate with the 
police, including joining them in the searches for militants, these guys if we had the chance, we would 
kill them, of course.[65]
Thus, the narratives of some former FP-25 militants were characterised by a sense of disgust for their targets’ 
behaviour – “They are not really people to me, I would not care if I saw them fallen on the sidewalk, quite 
frankly”.[66] The narratives were also permeated by a sense that the options of FP-25 for fighting injustices 
were extremely limited – “How could the organisation deal with this situation at that time? Send him a postcard 
wishing him happy holidays?”[67] – justifying the use of discriminate lethal violence by the organisation. 
It is important to note that, as in other militant groups, individuals’ commitment and involvement varied. Some 
felt very disappointed with the organisation’s strategies. They could, however, not simply leave the organisation: 
There was a time when I began to question what everything was, and how we were running the 
organisation, and I said I could not continue to participate in operations, but at the same time I could 
not move to a legal structure, or simply go home.[68]
This former militant, for instance, opted to take a more logistical role, distancing herself from the direct 
commission of acts of violence. This decision was mainly due to the death of comrades in confrontations with 
the police. These, in her opinion “were a tsunami within the organisation,” that caused “an extremely strong 
sense of guilt,” because “a good part of the deaths occurred due to clear operational failure”.[69] In other words, 
147ISSN  2334-3745 December 2020
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 14, Issue 6
she considered that the way the organisation was being run was responsible for the death of its militants, 
because “people with little experience were involved in actions too soon, because there wasn’t anyone else, and 
some of them fell along the way”.[70] Another former FP-25 militant found himself in a similar situation, but 
at an earlier stage of engagement with the organisation, which allowed him to disengage without having to face 
the state authorities:
Things started hitting hard with the start of the repression, arrests, deaths... who was playing around? I 
mean, had we left everything behind to get money, to rob some shitty corner banks? These were things 
that made no sense to anyone, in that context people were not there to rob small banks, they wanted to 
do other things, even without a great degree of violence, but things that were significant to them.[71]
The FP-25 was dismantled through the Operação Orion (Orion Operation) in June 1984, which closed down 
all FUP headquarters and arrested 60 people. However, the FP-25 remained active until its total dissolution in 
1989, even though between 1985 and 1987 the majority of its militants were arrested or sought refuge abroad.
[72]
Discussion and Conclusion
Molly Andrews affirmed that personal narratives do not only talk about the individual, “but provide a small 
window into the engines of history and historical change, as we both shape and are shaped by the events of 
our day”.[73] Therefore, at the heart of personal stories it is possible to find the intersection between historical 
context, and personal circumstances, which shed light on how and why certain events take place and why 
individuals behave in certain ways. In this article, we examined how different contemporary Portuguese armed 
organisations negotiated restraint to lethal violence according to the social and political contexts of their time. 
We found two main narratives in each phase of radical left violence analysed. In the first phase, lethal violence 
was seen as counterproductive and as philosophically and ideologically problematic. In the second phase, 
indiscriminate lethal violence was perceived as counterproductive and resulted in disappointment with the 
organisation. 
The first phase corresponds chronologically to the last years of Estado Novo’s regime (1968-1974) and was 
characterized by the activities of three different armed organisations – the LUAR, the ARA, and the BR – as 
they were fighting against the dictatorship and the Colonial War. Despite countless internal debates, these 
organisations established a no-kill rule as this type of action was unanimously seen as counterproductive to the 
struggle. They did not want to be perceived as terrorists by the general population, whose support they sought, 
or undermine the collaboration of other sectors opposing the regime like the progressive Catholics for whom 
the defence of the value of life was fundamental. For the ARA, as the armed wing of the PCP, it was important 
to maintain a balance between the defence of the armed struggle in the Portuguese case and the peaceful 
coexistence advocated by the international communist movement and by the Soviet Union. BR militants also 
raised moral concerns when it came to engage in lethal violence. Shortly after the April Revolution, the reading 
that these organisations made of the country’s political and social situation resulted in renouncing armed 
struggle, opting for the development of popular power structures. However, due to the radicalisation of the 
revolutionary process during the summer of 1975, the PRP started to defend the arming of workers to defend 
the achievements of the April Revolution and then opted to move the BR back into hiding. During the following 
years, the PRP focused on creating a unitary radical left structure that could contest elections and maintain the 
political struggle on a strictly legal level.
However, disputes within the PRP and the arrest of its historical leaders, led to the rise of the most radical 
sector within the organisation which wanted to return to armed struggle, challenging the dominant narrative 
of democratic consolidation. This gave rise to the second phase of radical left violence in contemporary 
Portugal, led by the FP-25, an organisation that engaged in lethal violence as a political strategy. For FP-25 
militants, these actions were justified by the direction of events after the April Revolution, as implementing 
a parliamentary democracy implied adhesion to the EEC and the reversal of many revolutionary conquests. 
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The serious economic crisis experienced by the country in the 1970s also played an important role in these 
militants’ radicalisation towards violence because it implied the entry of the IMF in Portugal and the adoption 
of austerity measures, which led to increased unemployment and poverty. For FP-25 militants, this context 
morally justified the adoption of more extreme actions, such as the death of company directors accused of 
mismanagement and dismissal of workers. However, the FP-25, in line with other leftist organisations,[74] 
never engaged in indiscriminate violence, which was seen as counterproductive since FP-25 aimed at obtaining 
the support of the population for their main objectives – to halt the advance of the right-wing forces in Portugal 
and to prevent a reversal of the conquests made by the revolutionary process. Restraint narratives were also 
found at the individual level, as over time some militants felt disappointed with the strategic directions taken 
by the organisation and decided to take logistical roles or leave the organisation.
In this study, we found three of the five barriers to mass casualty violence presented by Simi and Windisch’s 
framework based on life history interviews with former white supremacists – mass casualty violence seen as 
counterproductive; moral apprehension; and internal organizational conflict.[75] This points to the fact that 
the experiences of former violent militants, independently of ideological leanings and historical periods, can 
be quite similar. Our findings also substantiate some of the strategic and moral logics put forward by Busher, 
Holbrook and Macklin in their internal brakes on violent escalation typology.[76] These authors examined how 
people within militant groups manage their collective violence parameters and put forward different strategic 
and moral logics. When applying such logics to the Portuguese radical left organisations acting during the 
dictatorship, we see a solid historical consciousness prompting both strategic and moral narratives of restraint, 
but also the influence of the repressive environment which created highly compartmentalised organisations 
whose militants did not network much and were limited to following leadership directives. This scenario changed 
after the April Revolution, which raised a particularly politicised generation whose practice was informed by 
different strategic and moral logics. This generation of militants was no longer connected to political parties 
or broader international movements ideologically positioned against lethal violence. Furthermore, after the 
November 1975 coup the organisation leading the armed struggle also had a specific agenda – to incite the 
workers to act against the injustices committed at the workplace, which were perceived as a consequence of 
right-wing, capitalist policies. This contributed to weakening prior narratives and practices of restraint.
This article attempted to contribute to a growing body of literature on processes of restraint to violence, but it 
also answers a call from former militants to offer an analysis of the different types of violent actions carried out 
by different organisations. We perceived such a call in the context of the need to remember past struggles that 
has defined the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries [77] and decided to embark on this endeavour to 
also give something back to individuals who have shared so much with us. In doing so, we applied a narrative 
approach to understand processes of restraint to lethal violence as recounted by former politically violent 
militants to show how the accounts of their past experiences are influenced by what historical narratives were 
most important to them and how such narratives moulded their actions. 
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